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I. INTRODUCTION
THE DOCTRINE PROHIBITING THE CORPORATE
practice of medicine evolved as a state law restriction in the
early 1900s. Although this prohibition cannot be traced to one
direct source of law, it has emerged through a combination of
states' medical practice acts and public policy arguments es-
poused by several courts.' Some legitimate fears associated
1. See, e.g., Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337, 343-44 (I11. App.
Ct. 1996) (recognizing the public policy concerns pertinent to corporate practice such as lay
control and divided loyalties); St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 612 (Kan.
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with allowing corporations to engage in the practice of medi-
cine can be attributed to interests in preserving the sanctity of
independent physician-patient relationships.2 Those who are
wary about allowing corporations to practice medicine fear that
the disjointed interests of physicians (presumably concerned
with the well-being of patients) and corporations (presumably
concerned with shareholder satisfaction) will jeopardize the
quality and delivery of health care. "[C]ommercialization of
[medicine], exploitation of the public, and quackery"3 were
perceived to be evils that would ensue if corporations were
authorized to practice medicine.
Despite these legitimate concerns associated with allowing
corporations the freedom to practice medicine, state and judi-
cial enforcement since the 1950s has remained almost nonexis-
tent.4 This lack of enforcement, however, does not mitigate the
chilling effect that the doctrine imposes on practitioners and
other medical providers.'
Notwithstanding the lack of enforcement, the justification
behind barring corporations from practicing medicine appears
to overlook the realities of the current health care market place.
The justification is eroding as a result of the myriad statutory'
1994) (discussing public policy concerns such as divided loyalties and loss of physician au-
tonomy); Cal. Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr., 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768-69
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing public policy against lay control over optometrists); Parker v.
Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1932) (raising the concern of divided loyalties among
licensed dentists and a dental corporation).
2. The use of the term "practicing medicine" throughout this Note includes such acts as
corporations hiring licensed medical practitioners to provide needed medical services.
3. Alanson W. Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 432,434 (1960).
4. See Patricia F. Jacobson, Prohibition Against Corporate Practice of Medicine:
Dinosaur or Dynamic Doctrine? in 1993 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 67,67 (Alice G. Gosfield ed.,
1993) (commenting that the doctrine is a "hibernating bear waiting to wake up and assert itself').
See also J. Anthony Manger & Linda J. Cowell, The Corporate Practice Doctrine: Is it Still Via-
ble?, HEALTHSPAN, Apr. 1989, at 3, 8 (1989) (cautioning practitioners that even if health care
providers have devised ways to side-step the corporate practice doctrine, the need to reevaluate
the doctrine is still alive). See also Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control Of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 509-11 (1988) (stating
that even if the corporate practice of medicine doctrine exists nominally, the prohibition will still
influence corporations' willingness to innovate changes in organization).
5. The corporate practice of medicine prohibition is a "potential legal landmine for an
industry seeking to develop new structures and relationships in response to market pressures."
James F. Blumenstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust
and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1471 (1994).
6. See, e.g., infra, Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation" for examples of exceptions.
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and common law exceptions. Medical practitioners and provid-
ers must not ignore the corporate practice prohibition since it is
hard to predict when it will be enforced. It can hardly be de-
nied that in some respects the landscape within which physi-
cians practice medicine in the 1990s can be distinguished from
that of the early 1900s when the doctrine came into vogue.
Therefore, it is difficult to rationalize why the doctrine should
remain unmodified. State legislatures must review the prohibi-
tion and eliminate vestiges of its strictness if the strictness no
longer fits within the modem delivery of health care.
State legislatures cannot maintain the doctrine as it existed
in the early 1900s without considering the changes in the
structure and delivery of health care today. There has been a
trend toward moving away from traditional indemnity health
insurance plans (fee-for-service) toward managed care plans
(capitation).7 The number of Americans enrolled in health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) increased from nine million
in 1980 to forty million in 1992.' With a greater emphasis to-
ward cost-containment in health care, several physicians predict
that the health care industry will rely primarily on corporate
physicians working as salaried employees of managed care
plans, medical groups, medical foundations, and hospitals.9
Medical groups, hospitals, and management service organiza-
tions (MSOs) are also aggressively purchasing physician prac-
tices to achieve greater economies of scale." Furthermore,
attitudes of practicing physicians appear to be more accepting
of direct employment relationships with institutional health care
providers. In fact, many physicians today prefer employment
by medical corporations over the traditional solo-practitioner
arrangement."
7. The image of the gray-haired sole-practitioner family practice physician no longer
depicts the way in which health care is administered today.
8. See Robert A. Boisture, Health Reform Speeds Shift to Tax-Exempt Integrated Man-
aged Care Plans, HEALTHSPAN, May 1994, at 14 & n.72 (quoting 1992 enrollment data from
Group Health Association of America's National Directory of HMOs Database).
9. See Michael A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine Must Go,
HEALTHSPAN, Nov. 1994, at 9 (quoting Charles Culhane, Forecasters Agree on One Thing:
Changes are Coming, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 18, 1994, at 6).
10. Id. (citing Michael A. Dowell, Mergers and Acquisitions: Advantages and Pitfalls for
Health Care Providers, HEALTHSPAN, Dec. 1993, at 8).
11. More and more physicians are opting into employment relationships to ease the admin-
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Considering these developments in the health care industry
and looking forward to the twenty-first century, it is difficult to
perceive how state legislatures can allow the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine to remain exactly as it stands today. As
corporations around the nation attempt to respond to the prob-
lem of high health care expenditures 12 by controlling costs
through integrated delivery systems, "[the doctrine's] sweep
becomes oppressive... as it threatens desirable experimenta-
tion."'3 Therefore, state legislatures must review the existence
of the doctrine in light of the dramatically integrated health
care delivery system that exists today.
There are some abuses that the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine was developed to protect against which still must
be discouraged. Legitimate concerns include physician autono-
my over medical judgments, divided loyalties between a medi-
cal corporation, its physician employees and its patients, and
allowing unlicensed or lay persons to make medical treatment
decisions or diagnoses. However, imposing a complete ban on
istrative burdens within their practices. See Mike Mitka, Doctor Pay Shrinks for the First Time in
'94, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 22, 1996, at I (discussing a survey performed by the American
Medical Association's Center for Health Policy Research indicating that although self-employed
physicians are paid more than employee physicians, their presence in the market is
decreasing-58% in 1993 as opposed to 55% in 1994, while employee physicians have increased
their presence in the market from 36% to 39%, respectively). See also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz,
The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care
Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 446 n.8 (quoting Wessell, More Young Doctors Shun Private
Practice, Work as Employees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1986, at Al, which referenced a 1983 study
conducted by the American Medical Association that found that 39% of patient-care doctors
younger than age 36 were employees of corporate entities or large group practices. The study also
stated that the percentage of doctors who were employees decreases in older age groups as
follows: 23% of those between the ages of 36 and 45, 20% of those between the ages of 46 and
55, and 19% of those over age 56).
12. National health care expenditures are estimated to have reached $938 billion in 1994,
an increase of 6.1% over 1993. As a percent of the total United States economy (GDP), these
estimates are high. However, national health care expenditures are estimated to remain constant at
13.9% of GDP. Leveled growth in national health care expenditures predicted for 1994 can be at-
tributed to moderate growth in national health care expenditures coupled with relatively strong
growth in GDP. 1995 national health care expenditures were predicted to reach $1 trillion (14.2%
of GDP). In 2000, national health care expenditures are predicted to reach $1.5 trillion (15.9% of
GDP) and in 2005, national health care expenditures are predicted to reach $2.2 trillion (17.9% of
GDP). See Sally T. Burner & Daniel R. Waldo, National Health Expenditure Projections, 1994-
2005, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Summer 1995, at 221 (projecting national health care
expenditures for 1994-2005 using 1993 as a baseline year and assuming current practices and laws
remain constant).
13. See Hall, supra note 4 (quoting Joseph Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on
Contract and Corporate Practice of Medicine, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 516,527 (1939)).
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medical corporations' abilities to employ physicians remains
too strict and creates a chilling effect on health care providers
and practitioners who would like to enter into employment
arrangements with medical corporations.
This Note will focus on why mitigating the strictness of
the corporate practice doctrine in relation to its prohibition
against allowing corporations to enter into employment agree-
ments with licensed medical practitioners should be encouraged
and implemented through amendments to existing state legisla-
tion. Although the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
includes a prohibition against fee-splitting, that topic is beyond
the scope of this Note.'4 This Note will develop a unique
analysis of the corporate practice of medicine prohibition by
examining its weakening rationale as it is being whittled away
by numerous exceptions. Also, this Note will offer a unique
way of modifying the doctrine, considering the numerous safe-
guards already in place, through a proposed Uniform Physi-
cians Employment Act. Although the corporate practice doc-
trine has been previously criticized, there have been no works
that have recommended solutions to its strictness.
Section II of this Note will briefly outline the origins and
development of the venerable corporate practice of medicine
doctrine. Section III will describe the legal and policy flaws
and inconsistencies with the doctrine vis-A-vis the current
health care system. Section IV will discuss numerous legal
safeguards available to aid in protecting against those evils
which the corporate practice of medicine doctrine set out to
prevent. Section V will illustrate the potential threat of the
doctrine's staying power in light of recent federal and state
legislation. Finally, Section VI of this Note proposes to elimi-
nate the strictness of the doctrine by creating an alternative
Uniform Physicians Employment Act. This uniform act will
serve as a means for states to reconsider their current laws
pertaining to the corporate employment of physicians by advo-
cating a unified approach for practitioners and providers. The
Uniform Physicians Employment Act will encourage greater
14. For a discussion of fee-splitting in relation to the corporate practice of medicine
prohibition, refer to Hall, supra note 4, at 488-504.
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consistency for practitioners and providers throughout the na-
tion. As long as specific conditions are met by corporate health
care providers, 5 these corporations should be able to directly
employ physicians to administer health care services under the
Uniform Act.
H. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine originated in
the early 1900s "as an ethical restriction on physicians' eco-
nomic relations."' 6 Medical practice in the nineteenth century
was regarded as an inferior occupation. Physicians faced com-
petition with several "'irregulars' - quacks and healing sec-
tarians"' 7 who were not formally schooled in traditional medi-
cine. Patients were "[d]isenchanted with the often ineffective
and sometimes fatal results of... [popular] treatments,"' 8 and
turned to the irregulars and their promises for speedy cures.
Therefore, in 1846, the American Medical Association (AMA)
was established in part to curb the dissatisfaction within the
medical profession between physicians and "irregulars."
Notwithstanding the competition physicians faced from
irregulars in the late nineteenth century, independent physicians
were competing against contract practices. Contract practices
were arrangements where corporations employed physicians to
treat employees working in isolated industries such as mining
and industry. 9 This practice was the only way that employees
of remote industries such as these could obtain health care.
Independent physicians faced competition with other forms of
corporate practices as well.
The sentiment among physicians regarding contract and
other corporate practices was mixed. Some physicians opposed
15. See discussion infra Part VI "Proposal for State Legislative Action: The Uniform
Physicians Employment Act."
16. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 11, at 446.
17. Id. at448.
18. Id. at 449 (describing popular treatments administered by physicians such as
"bloodletting, purging, and administering heavy dosages of mercury or quinine").
19. Id. at 456 (defining contract practices as corporations employing physicians to treat
their employees in isolated industries such as "railroad, mining, and lumbering" as well as non-
isolated corporations for a "predetermined salary" dictated by the corporation).
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these practices because they created a bidding war among
physicians vying for work, which drove the levels of reim-
bursement down to unthinkable levels. Physicians were no lon-
ger protected by the "monopolistic designs" of the medical
profession? Other physicians, however, welcomed contract
and corporate practices because of the stability of income these
practices provided.
In the end, those physicians opposed to the contract and
corporate practices influenced the AMA to enact provisions to
prohibit them. The AMA responded by creating a set of ethical
provisions to prohibit these types of practices.2' However, the
decision in American Medical Association v. Federal Trade
Commission22 eviscerated physicians' efforts to prohibit the
corporate practice of medicine through the AMA's Principles
of Medical Ethics. As a result, the prohibition against the cor-
porate practice of medicine can no longer be enforced as an
ethical restriction on physicians. Instead, it must be read
through state statutes, medical practice acts, licensure require-
ments, as well as public policy arguments espoused through
common law.
Only a small number of state statutes explicitly prohibit
the corporate practice of medicine.' More typically, the pro-
hibition against corporations practicing medicine is implied by
interpretation of state medical practice acts or state licensure
requirements coupled with public policy concerns. Courts that
have perceived the prohibition as stemming from statutory
medical practice acts or licensure requirements hold that non-
natural persons, like corporations, are not able to meet the re-
quirements for practicing medicine. It is common for state
licensure requirements to call for licensees to possess "con-
sciousness, learning, skill, and good moral character."24 An
20. Id. at 457-58.
21. But see AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 453 (2nd Cir. 1980) (holding that the AMA's
ethical principles which forbid physicians from entering into arrangements with any non-
physician entity are anti-competitive).
22. Id.
23. See also infra Appendix-A for a state by state comparison of statutory prohibitions
against the doctrine as well as carve-outs.
24. Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1932) (describing the dental
practice laws governing dental practice in California).
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artificial entity, like a corporation, cannot possess those quali-
ties and is not able to sit for medical board examinations,
which is another requirement of some state statutes. Further-
more, the doctrine also prohibits fee-splitting arrangements
between medical corporations and physicians.'
Public policy concerns provide an additional line of judi-
cial attack against the corporate practice of medicine. First,
physician employment by corporations controlled by lay per-
sons arguably may reduce physician autonomy over medical
judgments.26 Second, employed physicians may experience a
sense of divided loyalty between their profit-seeking employer
and their treatment-seeking patients. Finally, public policy
arguments have been raised to attack the commercialization of
the medical profession. Critics of commercialization within the
health care arena are concerned that investors in for-profit
medical entities that employ physicians will exert too much
pressure on their physician-employees to promote the sale of
professional services in order to obtain large profits.' This
may create pressure on employed physicians to place a greater
emphasis on profitability over quality of patient care.29
25. See Hall, supra note 4, at 488-504.
26. For cases discussing the problem of loss of physician autonomy, refer to Garcia v. Tex.
Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434,438 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (explaining the public policy reasons
for restricting corporate practice of medicine), affd, 421 U.S. 995 (1975); People ex rel. State
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429,430 (Cal. 1938) (discussing the evils of
divided loyalties, impaired confidence in the physician and loss of freedom when lay control is
exercised over the medical profession); State ex rel. Bricker v. Buhl Optical Co., 2 N.E.2d 601,
604 (Ohio 1936) (holding that an optical company could not engage directly or indirectly in the
practice of optometry).
27. For cases discussing divided loyalty, refer to Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d at 430
(discussing divided loyalties as a problem whether the physician receives benefits as salary or fees
from a corporation); People v. United Med. Serv., Inc., 200 N.E. 157 (II1. 1936) (discussing the
corporate effect on the physician-patient relationship).
28. See Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337,346 (S.D. 1942) (discussing the for-
profit influence upon the medical profession and finding it against public policy).
29. See Mark A. Hall & Justin G. Vaughn, The Corporate Practice of Medicine, in
FOUNDATION AND REGULATION 3-3, 3-11 (Mark A. Hall ed. 1993). For cases discussing
commercial exploitation, refer to State v. Boren, 219 P.2d 566, 567 (Wash. 1950) (allowing the
state legislature to prohibit a corporation from owning or maintaining a dentistry practice in order
to combat its commercial exploitation); Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 338 (S.D.
1942) (discussing the for-profit influence upon the medical profession and finding it against
public policy); Silver v. Landsburgh Bro., Ill F.2d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (differentiating the
practice of medicine from the practice of optometry); Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d.
67,71 (Cal. 1932) (describing the state's rejection of the commercial exploitation of dentistry).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
A. State Licensure Requirements
State legislatures are given the power to regulate the prac-
tice of medicine since treating patients affects public health and
safety. 0 Concerns for protecting "public morals" also provide
a justification for state legislatures to enact laws which regulate
the practice of medicine. A real need exists for states to regu-
late medical practice through licensure and medical practice act
requirements given the reliance and trust patients place in their
physicians to render adequate health care. As a result, state
legislatures have used their authority to limit the practice of
medicine to natural persons.3' Obviously, since corporate med-
ical entities do not possess the human qualities necessary to
perform medical procedures, diagnose an ailment, or treat a
sick patient, corporations are not entitled to obtain licenses to
practice medicine. However, the problem with state licensure
laws and medical practice acts stems from courts' wide inter-
pretation and application of these laws. This wide interpretation
serves as the basis for prohibiting medical corporations from
employing licensed physicians to render health care.
Some courts have adopted the reasoning that since a medi-
cal corporation is physically unable to obtain a medical license
because they are not natural persons, they cannot practice
medicine.32 This line of reasoning overlooks the fact that cor-
porations do not want to practice medicine in the strict sense of
the meaning of medical practice. Rather, medical corporations
are interested in entering into employment contracts with phy-
sicians, dentists, and other health practitioners who are licensed
and can render medical care to the corporation's patients. For
the most part, medical corporations are not seeking to employ
unlicensed medical practitioners. On the contrary, a medical
30. See Parker, 12 P.2d at 71. See also Garcia v. Tex. Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. at
437 (commenting that states have an "unchallenged" right to regulate health services).
31. Jd.at438.
32. See, e.g., St. Francis Reg'] Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 618 (Kan. 1994)
(recognizing that without a proper license to engage in rendering health care, hospitals could not
engage in the practice of medicine and employ physicians).
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corporation relies on the licensed physicians who serve it in
order to function.
The more logical interpretation of state licensure and
medical practice acts which form the basis of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine should be to allow employment
relationships to exist between medical corporations and the
physicians who serve them. Entering into employment con-
tracts should be distinguished from diagnosing or treating a
patient for an ailment.33 "Making contracts is not practicing
medicine.. . [n]o professional qualifications are requisite for
doing these things."34 Therefore, prohibiting medical corpora-
tions from entering into employment contracts with licensed
physicians stretches the purpose of state medical practice acts
and licensure requirements to an illogical breaking point.
Courts should not base their determination of whether a
medical corporation violates the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine on the argument that because corporations are not
natural persons they cannot obtain medical licenses, and there-
fore, will violate the doctrine if they enter into employment
contracts with physicians. A better test to determine whether
one is practicing medicine should be "whether or not he holds
himself out as being able to 'diagnose, treat, operate or pre-
scribe for any human disease ... or who shall offer.., to
diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human dis-
ease."'35 Unless a corporation is truly interfering with its em-
ployed physicians' medical judgments, there seems to be no
sound basis for the continued blanket and unconditional prohi-
33. See Parker, 14 P.2d at 76 (differentiating between corporations making contracts or
collecting payment for services and corporations making professional medical judgments). See
also People v. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 85 N.E. 697, 698 (N.Y. 1908) (holding that
registration requirements were not intended to apply to corporations (hospitals, dispensaries...)
which were authorized under an alternative statute to carry on the practice of medicine upon
compliance with those statutes' requirements without registration).
34. Parker, 14 P.2nd at 76 (arguing that the California legislature did not intend the
practice of dentistry to include a corporation which did nothing more than conduct the business
affairs of the office) (emphasis added).
35. See St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 869 P.2d at 616 (quoting Rush v. St. Petersburg, 205
So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), which extended the test espoused for determining
whether a hospital intern was practicing medicine in Watson v. Centro Espanol De Tampa, 30 So.
2d 288 (1947), to apply to corporate entities as well). Cf. State ex inf. Sager v. Lewin, 106 S.W.
581, 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (distinguishing corporations engaged in the practice of medicine
with corporations in the business of contracting for the practice of medicine).
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bitions on contractual employment arrangements which courts
have interpreted as violative of the corporate practice of medi-
cine doctrine.36
B. Public Policy Concerns Being Ignored with Several
Exceptions to the Doctrine37
State legislatures as well as courts have created several
exceptions to the corporate practice doctrine. Some of the ex-
ceptions to the corporate practice doctrine allow professional
corporations, not-for-profit hospitals, HMOs, teaching hospitals,
and industrial organizations to enter into employment contracts
with physicians." Although the entities that fall under the
corporate practice exceptions do not violate the doctrine per se,
the public policy concerns are just as alive in these ar-
rangements as in non-exempt corporate entities.
The public policy concerns behind the doctrine appear to
be ignored as so many arrangements are being excepted from
the rule. State legislatures and courts alike are applying the
doctrine inconsistently by carving out numerous exceptions
which comprise a large sector of the health care industry.
Meanwhile, several corporate entities with similar structures
and characteristics as exempt arrangements are being required
to comply with the corporate practice doctrine. If state legisla-
tures believe that the public policy concerns behind the corpo-
rate practice doctrine are not as strong as they were at the time
of inception, the state legislatures should clarify or amend their
laws to that effect.39 Otherwise, corporations operating within
36. Some states have carved out exceptions to the corporate practice doctrine to mitigate
the extreme effects of the rule. However, the doctrine still creates problems for corporate entities
engaged on the business side of medicine. See infra Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation," for a
state by state comparison of exceptions.
37. With respect to state licensure requirements, it is a non-sequitur that corporations are
incapable of possessing the human qualities necessary to obtain a license to practice medicine.
Therefore, it is more useful to analyze corporations' activities in relation to the public policy
concerns of lay control, divided loyalty, and commercialism than simply whether a corporation
possessed a license.
38. See infra Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation," for a state by state comparison.
39. See discussion infra Part VI regarding proposal for action and clarity.
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the health care industry will have to take their chances as a
non-exempt corporate entity.
Section III-B of this Note will analyze common statutory
exceptions to the corporate practice doctrine through the lens
of the public policy concerns raised by the doctrine - lay
control, divided loyalties, and commercialization. 4' By analyz-
ing the statutory exceptions to the corporate practice of medi-
cine in this light, this section will illustrate how the doctrine is
being eroded as its public policy concerns are given arbitrary
weight depending on the situation. This problem provides fur-
ther support for the proposition that the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine cannot exist as is. State legislators should be
convinced that the time has come to remove the strictness of
the doctrine in response to the reality that the strictness is
being whittled away in practice. Maintaining the facade that
the corporate practice of medicine prohibition remains a com-
plete bar to corporations employing licensed physicians causes
confusion as it distorts the realities of modem medical practic-
es.
1. Professional Corporations Exception
a. Lay Control
A professional corporation is, by definition, "organized by
those rendering personal services to [the] public of a type
which requires a license ... which prior to such... [licensure]
could not be performed by a corporation."4 In interpreting
this definition of a professional corporation, the public policy
concern over lay person control does not appear to be relevant
in a professional corporation structure. Since all members of a
professional corporation are required to be professionals, or
properly licensed, the risks associated with lay control do not
exist.' Furthermore, the very purpose behind professional
40. See supra footnotes 26-29 and accompanying text for an explanation of the public
policy concerns.
41. See BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 342 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See Hall & Vaughn, supra note 29, at 3-18 (stating that many states require share-
holders of a professional corporation to also be active in the practice). But see MODEL PROF.
CORP. SUPP. § 30 (1984) (allowing professional corporation membership to consist of up to 50%
2531997]
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corporations is to minimize the risks of diluting professional
norms by requiring members to have the requisite professional
qualifications.43 This precept of maintaining professional
norms through an organization of licensed physicians, not lay
persons, is exactly what the corporate practice doctrine was
designed to encourage.
However, in those states which have adopted the Revised
Model Act,' the requirements for professional corporation
membership may no longer be limited to licensed profession-
als. Because of the fresh viewpoints, objectivity, and outside
expertise lay members may bring to a professional corporation,
only fifty percent of the directors and fifty percent of principal
officers are required to be licensed professionals under the
Revised Model Act.4' Although the public policy concern over
having lay persons participate in the control of medical corpo-
rations has merit, those states that allow lay membership within
professional corporations are still susceptible to the dangers of
lay influence. Therefore, the professional corporation scenario
provides a good illustration of the arbitrariness of the corporate
practice prohibition's scope, despite the presence of the public
policy concern about lay corporate control.
b. Divided Loyalty
Another public policy concern behind the corporate prac-
tice doctrine is the fear of physicians' divided loyalties be-
tween a corporate employer and their patients.' The argument
behind creating an exception for professional corporations rests
on the premise that physician members of a professional corpo-
ration will remain autonomous in their health care decision
making. If member physicians within a professional corpora-
tion maintain their autonomy, patient welfare should not be
lay members).
43. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 5-23 (1995).
44. See MODEL PROF. CORP. Supp. § 30 (1984) (allowing professional corporation
membership to consist of up to 50% lay members).
45. Id.
46. See Garcia v. Tex. Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 440 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (ex-
plaining the public policy reasons for restricting the corporate practice of medicine).
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placed at risk. This public policy argument in favor of exempt-
ing professional corporations is valid only if states have not
adopted a provision mirrored after the Revised Model Act.'
Otherwise, the potential problem of lay members' interference
with physician-members' autonomous medical judgment re-
mains.
c. Commercialization
Public policy concerning commercialization of the medical
profession may be violated, notwithstanding the fact that li-
censed professionals comprise the membership of professional
corporations. Even assuming that a professional health care
corporation does not have any lay membership, the public
policy concern for protecting against commercialization is still
very much alive. After all, physician members of a professional
corporation are "owners" of that professional corporation.
Physician members will contemplate their return on invest-
ment when making a decision that will affect the professional
corporation. If they did not, they would not bear the financial
risks of incorporating as a professional corporation. The physi-
cian members' profit motives and concern for creating market
power seem no different in this type of arrangement than in
general corporations where shareholders are interested in the
financial performance and future of the company. Furthermore,
professional corporation members are afforded limited liability
status for "ordinary business obligations of the corporation (i.e.
business debts, negligence unassociated with professional ser-
vices, bankruptcy)"' similar to that of owners of general cor-
porations. Though each individual physician member is liable
for rendering professional services within a professional corpo-
ration, there are no incentives as a collective group to be any
more cautious over decisions than members of a general corpo-
ration since limited liability applies to the entire professional
corporation. It is difficult to rationalize, therefore, how medical
47. See MODEL PROF. CORP. SUPP. § 30 (1984) (allowing membership to consist of up to
50% lay members).
48. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at § 5-26.
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credentials of physician members will automatically buffer the
professional corporation against commercialization and market
abuse just by virtue of member physicians' medical licenses.
2. Not-For-Profit Hospital Exception
Some state legislatures and courts have recognized not-for-
profit hospitals as an exception to the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine.49 Since not-for-profit hospitals must meet
both the organizational and operational tests50 of Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code in order to qualify for
tax-exempt status, it is reasonable to allow these corporations
to employ physicians and engage in the corporate practice of
medicine. In order to receive tax-exempt status under
§501(c)(3), corporations must be "organized and operated for
religious, charitable, scientific.., or educational purposes."5'
Not-for-profit health care institutions can serve an important
function in society by providing charitable health care to the
indigent and to under-served communities. However, today's
not-for-profit hospitals are being heavily scrutinized and criti-
cized for their lack of commitment to charitable purposes.52 If
today's not-for-profit hospitals are tending to approximate for-
profit hospitals in their structure and behavior, then the excep-
tion for these entities appears to be an arbitrary application of
the doctrine.
Because many not-for-profit health care providers are
being forced to compete with fully integrated and cost con-
scious for-profit entities, not-for-profit institutions are begin-
ning to pay less attention to charitable purposes and more
attention to competition and commercialization.53 In light of
49. See Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation," for examples.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (1986).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (1986) (providing tax-exempt status in exchange for charity
care). See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1997).
52. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS: BETER STANDARDS
NEEDED FOR THE EXEMPTION HRD-90-84 (May 1990) (concluding that Congress should consider
revising the criteria for tax exemption if it believes that providing charity care should be a
fundamental basis for such an exemption).
53. See Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasker, Who Profits from Nonprofits?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 94, 104-05 (illustrating that nonprofit hospitals tend to act to serve
the self-interests of the professionals within the organization at the expense of societal interests in
better access to health care services). But see Jan P. Clement et al., What Do We Want and What
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this movement away from charitable giving, the distinctions
between for-profit and not-for-profit entities become blurred.
The statutory exceptions to the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine which apply to not-for-profit hospitals and foundations
must be reconsidered against this current trend away from
charitable purposes.
a. Lay Control
Not-for-profit entities may only allocate earnings toward
their tax-exempt activities in conformity with the private inure-
ment clause of the Internal Revenue Code.54 Earnings, there-
fore, may not be distributed to management, private sharehold-
ers, or other institutional decision makers. These private inure-
ment prohibitions may appear to be a safeguard against afford-
ing lay hospital administrators the opportunity to take advan-
tage of a not-for-profit hospital by rewarding themselves with
unreasonable monetary rewards for the entity's profits.
However, board membership within not-for-profit hospitals
must include lay members of the community.5 Although lay
members of a not-for-profit hospital board do serve important
roles to ensure that the tax relief given to not-for-profit hospi-
tals is paid back through community benefits, such as care for
the indigent,56 lay membership on the board flies in the face
of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Because the
potential for lay influence on boards is alive in not-for-profit
entities, the distinctions between not-for-profit and for-profit
Do We Get from Not-for-Profit Hospitals?, 39 HOSP. & HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. 159, 174-75
(1994) (suggesting that not-for-profit hospitals should provide benefit reports to members of the
community to approve and illustrating that 75% of California not-for-profit hospitals meet one of
the five suggested community benefits: uncompensated care, education and research, below-cost
services, price discounts, and retained earnings). See also Barbara Arlington & Cynthia Carter
Haddock, Who Really Profits from Not-for Profits?, 25 HEALTH SERV. RESouRCES 291,291-301
(1990) (commenting on the Herslinger and Krasker article which is also cited in this footnote).
54. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(2)(c)(2) (1986) (stating that an organization is not tax-
exempt if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or
individuals).
55. See Boisture, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing the Internal Revenue Service's insistence
that the Board of Directors for foundation model integrated delivery systems (IDS) limit physician
representation to 20% and that the rest of the Board be comprised of community members).
56. See Clement et al., supra note 53, at 176.
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organizations that some states have made in interpreting the
corporate practice doctrine is no longer as sharp.
b. Divided Loyalty
The public policy concern over division of loyalty takes
on a different shape within a not-for-profit hospital. Conflicts
that physicians may have between patient care and corporation
profits are mitigated by the very nature of the not-for-profit
structure since profits must be used for exempt activities and
may not inure to private individuals, shareholders, et cetera.
However, the division of loyalty that exists is an indirect one.
Since not-for-profit managers have weak market controls gaug-
ing or checking their management over profits, it is likely that
they may keep profits away from charitable purposes by
awarding large salaries to hospital administrators and may also
employ excessively large staffs.57 Indirectly, therefore, the
not-for-profit structure provides opportunities for division of
loyalty because the administrators who have no real economic
stakes tied into the performance of their not-for-profit hospi-
tals. Earnings that may be funneled away to pay excessive
salaries instead of providing for charitable patient needs may
lead to problems of divided loyalties by shifting resources
away from charitable purposes toward wasteful ones.
c. Commercialization
Not-for-profit hospitals exhibit a strong market force in
the U.S. health care system. The largest sector of hospital beds
is organized as not-for-profit entities." Also, tax-exempt sta-
tus may create an additional incentive for not-for-profit hospi-
tals to commercialize since this tax benefit provides an advan-
57. See Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 53, at 94.
58. See Boisture, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting Health United States 1992, National Center for
Health Statistics that stated in 1992 that 56% of American hospitals were organized as not-for-
profit corporations comprising 65.5% of all hospital beds in the nation and for-profit hospitals
comprised only 9.9% of all hospital beds.)
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tage over for-profit corporations who incur federal tax liability.
Although not-for-profit hospitals retain a larger market pres-
ence than for-profit hospitals, the market base for these two
types of arrangements is identical. As a result, trying to remain
competitive with for-profit hospitals may conflict with the
charitable purposes and community benefits required of the
tax-exempt provider." Not-for-profit hospitals may obtain a
competitive advantage over for-profit hospitals because of the
tax subsidy unique to not-for-profit entities. It is difficult to
discern whether tax-exempt status is being commercially ex-
ploited in today's integrated health care delivery system, al-
though the issue has been the subject of much debate.' How-
ever, because of their market presence and the potential to
exert a competitive tax advantage over for-profit hospitals,
public policy concerns over not-for-profit hospitals' commer-
cialization are valid.
3. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)
Health Maintenance Organizations evolved as a means of
improving upon the excesses of traditional cost-based reim-
bursement schemes through capitated reimbursement
schemes.6' Congressional enactment of a federal HMO en-
abling statute paved the way for their proliferation among the
states.62 Prohibiting HMOs from contracting with physicians
could arguably fall under activity which inhibits HMOs' abili-
ties to organize (state activities that can be construed as inhibit-
ing the operation of HMOs are prohibited).63 Enacting a state
law or enforcing an already existing state law which limits the
freedom of HMOs would violate the federal HMO enabling
59. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at § 2-4.
60. See Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 53, at 105 (cautioning that not-for-profit hos-
pitals must not ignore the important social benefits that they were organized to provide).
61. See J. Warren Salmon, The Health Maintenance Organization Strategy, in THE CoRPO-
RATE TRANSFORMATION OF HEALTH CARE: IssuEs & DIRECTIONS 83, 86-87 (J. Warren Salmon
ed., 1990) (describing "[t]he HMO [s]trategy" as one that accounts for the sophisticated medical
advancement, the specialization and division of labor on a large scale, complex organization and
control by administrators and financial managers in order to make profits by encouraging
preventative health care programs and economic incentives like capitation).
62. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e-10 (West 1996) (prohibiting state laws which support
requirements that inhibit HMOs' existence).
63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e - 10(a)(1)(E) (West 1996) (prohibiting state laws which contain
requirements that inhibit HMOs' compliance with federal law).
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statute. As a result, almost all of the states have exempted
HMOs from the corporate practice prohibition.64 Notwith-
standing an HMOs' lofty goals of preventing over-utilization
through capitation and other cost-containment mechanisms, the
HMO structure embodies characteristics which the corporate
practice of medicine was designed to avoid. Lay control, divid-
ed loyalty, and commercialism are all palpable concerns within
an HMO structure.
a. Lay Control
The decision to approve medical procedures or lengths of
hospital stays for HMO subscribers is often made by lay per-
sons, although some approvals are made by physicians em-
ployed by an HMO to approve medical treatments. To alleviate
the potential for abuses of lay power within HMOs, provider-
operated HMOs are becoming increasingly popular. Provider-
operated HMOs afford physicians a higher level of autonomy
since they would be able to control both the financing and
delivery of health care.65 Although this may seem like the best
method to eliminate the problem of lay control within a health
care system, this model tends to approximate that of a profes-
sional corporation. Like the professional corporation, provider-
operated HMOs will still exhibit problems of divided loyalties
and commercialism. Physicians practicing within provider-
operated HMOs have no less incentive to consider their finan-
cial interests in the organization than in professional corpo-
rations.
b. Divided Loyalty
The issue of who actually controls health care decisions
64. See infra Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation," for examples.
65. See Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational
Models, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 273, 295 (1994) (explaining how combining the delivery and
financing aspects of health care create efficient health care systems which unify goals and
incentives for providing health care).
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within HMOs has become a popular topic of debate.' Having
the HMO dictate a capitation payment schedule at the outset of
a physician's contract with that HMO imposes severe con-
straints within which the physician must provide care.67 Al-
though capitation may appear to be the solution to high health
care costs, this system of reimbursement may create an incen-
tive for physicians to underutilize care. Capitation, therefore,
creates a dilemma for the HMO physician. First, should the
physician withhold care because the HMO will not pay for it?
If so, the physician could face medical malpractice charges.
Second, the only alternative for that physician to provide care
in excess of the capitated level is to bear personally the burden
of the extra costs of care." Because of this dilemma, it is dif-
ficult to see how HMO physicians can ensure that their prima-
ry concern will be for the patients' welfare.
Similarly, HMOs impose gag orders within their contracts
which in essence prohibit the physician from discussing the
details of the capitation payment schemes within which they
must provide care. Gag orders prevent a physician from dis-
cussing alternate treatments not offered by the patient's plan.
Additionally, gag orders prohibit the HMO physicians from
recommending specialists who do not participate in the plan.69
Violation of these gag provisions may lead the HMO to dese-
lect the responsible physician from the HMO plan.7" Many of
the HMO contracts allow for deselection without cause' With
the constant threat of loss of employment, or deselection from
an HMO, it is not hard to see that division of loyalty between
the HMO physician and the patient are real concerns within
66. See, e.g., Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 54
(discussing problems of divided loyalties between physicians and HMOs which have resulted in
adverse health results in HMO patients).
67. A capitated rate is a fixed, predetermined payment for provisions of health service per
HMO patient.
68. See Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (illustrating the dilemma
of a physician faced with denial of an extended hospital stay by MediCal), vacated 727 P.2d 753
(Cal. 1986).
69. For a detailed discussion of gag orders and their effect on physician activity, refer to
Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Stop Gagging Physicians! 7 HEALTh MATRIx 189 (1997).
70. Deselection is the process by which an HMO may terminate its relationship with a plan
physician, usually without cause.
71. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Primary Care Physician Agreement § 5.2 (1994) (on file
with the author).
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this type of organization.
c. Commercialization
Enrollment in HMOs is growing7 2 while more physicians
are opting to choose employment relationships with HMOs
because of the competitive advantages HMOs offer within the
health care market. 3 As HMOs gain market power, they are
able to exert a significant presence in the health care industry.
Whether physicians choose to become HMO employees or
choose to organize as provider-owned HMOs similar to profes-
sional corporations, HMOs definitely exert the market power
which the corporate practice doctrine was designed to discour-
age. Protecting the market power of the sole-practitioners from
abuses was an important precept of the original corporate prac-
tice prohibition. However, with the changing landscape of the
delivery of health care towards managed care, the commercial
aspects of HMOs may no longer be considered as great an evil.
Despite these problems of lay control, divided loyalty, and
commercialism inherent in HMOs, several states have enacted
laws which exempt HMOs from the corporate practice prohibi-
tion.74 Given the underlying rationale that HMOs are designed
to contain health care costs, the HMO exception to the corpo-
rate practice prohibition is at least understandable if not justi-
fied. However, the problem with exempting HMOs is not with
encouraging cost-containment under these arrangements, rather
it is the arbitrariness of creating exceptions to the corporate
practice doctrine when its tenets are being violated. The arbi-
trariness of outlining exceptions to the corporate practice prohi-
bition will undermine the doctrine's staying power. Therefore,
state legislatures should re-analyze other non-HMO medical
corporations in this same manner and alleviate some of the
doctrine's strictness.
72. See Boisture, supra note 8, at 14 (requiring even Medicare and Medicaid recipients to
join approved HMOs to receive care under these programs).
73. See Mitka, supra note 11, at 7 (describing the decline in the percentage of self-
employed physicians and the rise in the percentage of employee-physicians).
74. See Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation," for examples.
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4. Independent Contractors
By definition, independent contractors do not engage in
the corporate practice of medicine. Since they are not em-
ployed by the hospital and retain individual medical licenses to
practice, they do not create the same threat of lay control and
divided loyalties as do other arrangements. Commercialism is
not at issue with independent contractors since each contractor
can not possess enough market power to influence the delivery
of health care.
C. Alternative Methods of Examining the Doctrine
Although teaching hospitals and MSOs75 have no struc-
tural similarities, their characteristics provide a basis for sound
arguments as to why the corporate practice of medicine doc-
trine should be revamped or reexamined. Using both teaching
hospitals and MSOs as examples of how the interpretation of
the meaning of the doctrine should be modified will illustrate
the weaknesses in the doctrine's rationale. These two examples
provide a better method of analysis for courts to use when
faced with a potential violation of the corporate practice doc-
trine.
1. Teaching Hospitals
There have been a few cases which have addressed the
corporate practice of medicine prohibition in relation to teach-
ing hospitals.76 Specifically, the arguments espoused in Los
75. See Hitchner et al., supra note 65, at 285 n.50 (cautioning that there is no uniformly
accepted meaning of the term MSO because MSO is not a legally defined term and may stand for
a "management service organization, a managed services organization, or a medical service
organization").
76. See, e.g., Albany Med. College v. McShane, 489 N.E.2d 1278, 1278 (N.Y. 1985)
(holding that a state-chartered medical college did not violate the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine when it shared fees generated by physician faculty members because the college's
corporate charter empowered it to promote medical instruction); San Diego v. Gibson, 284 P.2d
501, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (holding contract between county board of supervisors and
charitable corporation that provided medical and teaching services did not constitute the corporate
practice of medicine); Los Angeles County v. Ford, 263 P.2d 638, 642-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)
(compelling the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors to execute contracts to allow two medical
schools to render medical and teaching services to the county hospital and finding no violation of
the corporate practice prohibition).
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Angeles County v. Ford are good examples of how the cor-
porate practice of medicine doctrine should be applied in all
contexts, not just teaching hospitals. In Ford, two accredited
medical schools were seeking to enter into a contract with the
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to receive fair com-
pensation for providing their licensed medical teaching staffs'
services to indigents treated within the county hospitals.7" A
separate contract for each school's services was entered into
by the County Board of Supervisor's chief administrative offi-
cer. These contracts were approved by the Board, but were
rejected by the chairman of the Board of Supervisors. The
chairman refused to execute these contracts on the basis that
they violated the corporate practice of medicine prohibition.
The court held that the not-for-profit medical schools could
enter into contracts to provide health care to the indigent, via
the county hospitals, without violating the corporate practice
doctrine.79
Although Ford involved a situation where charity care was
being administered in a not-for-profit context, the application
of the Ford court's rationale in favor of the medical schools
should be extended to for-profit arrangements as well. The
Ford court recognized that the contracts to provide indigent
care did not call for the entire medical school's administration
to render care. On the contrary, the actual provision of medical
services was to be made exclusively through licensed physician
faculty members. Since the medical schools themselves do not
influence the physician's medical decision, they play no part
in the physician-patient relationship." Therefore, the risks of
lay control and divided loyalties are minimized.
The rationale set forth in Ford should be extended to
apply to for-profit medical corporations who enter into employ-
ment contracts with licensed physicians to provide health care
services. So long as the medical corporations do not interfere
with the medical decisions of their employee-physicians, they
should not be considered to have engaged in the practice of
77. 263 P.2d 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
78. Id. at 638-39.
79. Id. at 643.
80. Id. at 642-43.
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medicine." Unless a medical corporation's administrators are
involved in the actual treatment and diagnoses of patients' ail-
ments, medical corporations should be able to employ licensed
physicians to render those services to patients. 2
It is difficult, therefore, to reconcile cases which hold that
the doctrine is being violated simply because a corporation is
employing physicians with what appears to be the more logical
interpretation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 3
The more logical position should be to allow corporations to
employ physicians so long as the employee physicians retain
their freedom of action where lay control, divided loyalty, and
commercialism would have little effect on the physician-patient
relationship. However, it may be difficult to develop exacting
criteria defining what constitutes freedom of action and what
should be excluded since each situation will be fact-specific. It
is equally difficult to condemn employment arrangements be-
tween hospitals and licensed physicians solely on the basis that
the hospital, as a corporate structure, is unable to obtain a
medical license. 4 The line of demarcation that courts have
drawn, based on structure, should be reanalyzed in terms of
81. Courts should, however, find those corporations who render treatment and diagnoses
through unlicensed employees in violation of the corporate practice doctrine.
82. Cf. People exr el. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429,430 (Cal.
1938) (stating that the fact that a corporation itself did not take part in rendering actual treatment
and diagnostic services did not absolve the corporation from violating the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine).
83. See Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67,71-72 (Cal. 1932) (rejecting medical
corporation's argument that there was a distinction between the practice of dentistry and the
business aspects of the corporation and, therefore, finding that the corporation violated the
corporate practice doctrine). See also Cal. Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr.,
191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 769 (Cal. CL App. 1983) (holding that Pearle Vision held itself out as an
optometrist by exerting control over the financial aspects and practices of its franchisees in
violation of the corporate practice doctrine). But cf. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d
606, 618 (Kan. 1994) (holding that a licensed hospital's employment contracts for services of
physicians did not violate the corporate practice of medicine doctrine where the test to determine a
violation of the doctrine should be whether the corporation was holding itself out as being able to
diagnose, treat, operate, or prescribe for any human disease, pain, or injury); State Bd. Exam'rs
of Optometry v. Pearle Vision Ctr., 767 P.2d 969, 978 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that an optical
dispensing franchisor did not violate the corporate practice doctrine since it had little control over
the decisions of the licensed optometrist); Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Med. Ctr., 44 Cal. Rptr.
572, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (discussing that even though the corporate practice doctrine was not
at issue in the case, the fact that the doctors retained theirfreedom of action relieved the hospital
from liability).
84. See St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 869 P.2d at 618 (holding that without medical
providers, a hospital cannot achieve that for which it is created and licensed to treat the sick and
injured).
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whether the form of the arrangement is truly interfering with a
physician's freedom of action, not on an abstract basis of
corporate form. 2. MSOs85
Another example of a corporate practice exception is the
MSO arrangement. MSOs will typically acquire the tangible
assets of physicians' practices as well as provide administra-
tive management services for the practices, or other medical
groups.86 These arrangements are typically made under con-
tract whereby lay management organizations take control over
administrative services within a hospital or hospital-physician
group joint venture. MSOs can take on several organizational
forms such as a simple hospital service, or becoming a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a hospital, or a corporation owned by
shareholders.""7 MSOs offer efficiency and economies of scale
for independently practicing physicians through the use of
"common administrative personnel and information systems,
volume purchasing, and consolidate[d] services and equip-
ment."8 Therefore, the benefit to physicians would be that
they could have more time to devote to delivering health care
services to their patients.
Since MSOs are not making medical decisions per se, but
are merely serving as an administrative arm for independent
physicians, it is easy to see how this type of arrangement falls
outside of the reach of the corporate practice doctrine. Admin-
istrative services differ from medical services. Administrative
services involve little direct contact with patients and require
no license to perform. Such services include practices like
billing health insurance companies, purchasing supplies, and
monitoring the maintenance of patient records. Conversely,
medical services involve direct patient contact, where the medi-
cal treatments and diagnoses require special medical training
and licensure.
In the MSO arrangement, medical decisions are still made
85. See Hitchner et al., supra note 65, at 285-87 (explaining the MSO model of inte-
gration).
86. See id. at 285.
87. Id. at 285-86.
88. Id. at 286.
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by the licensed physicians contracting with the MSOs. 9
Therefore, if states are willing to recognize exceptions to the
corporate practice doctrine for MSOs because of their purely
administrative functions, other non-MSO medical corporations
providing only administrative services should also be exempt-
ed. That is, corporate entities which provide merely general
administrative, financial support, or arrange for employment of
licensed physicians or medical practitioners should not be con-
sidered to be violating the doctrine as long as that they do not
interfere with physicians' medical determinations.'
D. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Supports Contracts with
Non-Physicians
The FTC supports the notion of providing physicians and
other medical practitioners the opportunity to enter into em-
ployment or proprietary contracts with hospitals or other lay
institutions.9 In American Medical Association v. Federal
Trade Commission, the FTC argued that the ethical provisions
set forth in the AMA Code of Medical Ethics discouraged
physicians from entering into potentially efficient business
formats and restricted physicians' ability to develop business
structures in a manner they desired.92 The AMA was ordered
to modify its Code of Medical Ethics to rid it of its anti-com-
petitive language.93
89. See id.
90. The proper test should be based on whether the level of control a corporation has over
licensed physicians or medical practitioners in the arrangement intrudes on the practitioners'
ability to practice medicine. See Bd. of Exam'rs of Optometry v. Pearle Vision Ctr., 767 P.2d 969
(Wyo. 1989) (applying a test based on franchisor's control over franchisee's medical decision
and concluding that franchisor did not exhibit control over the franchisee's medical domain). But
cf. Cal. Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 769 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (overlooking the control test and finding that the franchisor did violate the corporate
practice doctrine because of its controls on the financial aspects of franchisees' practices).
91. See AMA v. FTC, 94 FTC 701, 701 (1979) (holding that certain provisions of the
AMA's code of medical ethics which prohibited physicians from working for or entering into
business relationships with non-physicians unreasonably restrained competition), affid, 638 F.2d
443 (2nd Cir. 1980), affd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
92. AMA v. FTC, 94 FTC at 701.
93. The AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Preamble § VI, at xiv (1994) reads: "[a]
physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to
choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical
services" (emphasis added). But cf. the 1957 version of the AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS at
§ 111 (1957) which was at issue in AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 447 (1980): "[a] physician should
2671997]
HEALTH MATRIX
The FTC has also been active in commenting about the
benefits of commercial practice within several medical disci-
plines. Specifically, the FTC has analyzed whether there are
benefits derived from limiting certain professions, such as
medicine, to its licensed members. Although the FTC acknowl-
edges that licenses have been required in order to "maintain
quality of service and protect the professional's independent
judgment, 94 it takes the position that "such restrictions in the
licensed businesses [such as medicine] are usually [maintained]
to reduce competition and increase prices."95 Since this activi-
ty has the effect of harming consumers, the FTC has concluded
that these practices should be carefully weighed.'
Another criticism the FTC has set forth about restricting
affiliations between licensed medical practitioners and lay
corporations is that it restricts professional groups from taking
advantage of the capital resources of those corporate entities.97
Having the ability to take advantage of a strong capital position
can allow medical entities to develop large-scale practices that
can benefit from economies of scale and stronger purchasing
power.98 Therefore, the FTC encourages the removal of prohi-
bitions which restrict lay entities and professional practitioners
from entering into employment arrangements and other busi-
ness relationships; otherwise, innovation and efficiency will be
stifled.99 The FTC's favorable acceptance of allowing lay
practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate
professionally with anyone who violates this principle" (emphasis added).
94. Letter from Harold Kirtz, Deputy Director, Federal Trade Commission, to the Hon-
orable John T. Bragg, Tennessee House of Representatives 3 (Feb. 2, 1996) (on file with the
author).
95. Id. (citing C. Cox and S. Foster, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATION, FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report (1990) which found that licensure require-
ments increased costs but did not appear to increase the quality of services and cautioned groups
to weigh the likely costs against prospective benefits of using licensure as a determinative factor).
See also Letter from Christian S. White, Acting Director, Federal Trade Commission, to the
Honorable Gary A. Merritt, Kansas House of Representatives 5 (Feb. 10, 1995) (on file with
author) (citing Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, The Effects of Restrictions on
Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry, FTC Bureau of
Economics Study (1980) which found that commercial practice restrictions resulted in higher
prices from optometric services and products, but did not improve the overall quality of care in the
optometry markets) [hereinafter Letter from White].
96. See Letter from Harold Kirtz to the Honorable John T. Bragg, supra note 94, at 3.
97. See Letter from White, supra note 95, at 6.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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corporate entities to contract with licensed medical profession-
als provides strong support for streamlining the corporate prac-
tice doctrine. Although FTC rulings do not have the effect of
invalidating state laws which authorize such activities,"° its
position is definitely persuasive authority for action.
E. Lack of Enforcement
Case law interpreting the corporate practice doctrine has
been sparse. Many of the courts still rely on corporate practice
doctrine precedents set in the 1930s. The doctrine can be in-
voked as a sword or a shield to a breach of contract claim or
violation of a covenant not to compete clause brought by a
hospital or other health care corporation."' Despite the doc-
trine's lack of enforcement, the prohibition can have a chilling
effect on medical corporations' transactions. The uncertainty
of whether the doctrine will be enforced is a matter of great
concern. The penalties for violating the corporate practice
doctrine include injunctive relief and loss of license so that
both the corporation and its physicians would have valid rea-
sons not to ignore the doctrine altogether. If state legislatures
would take the time to reexamine the corporate practice doc-
trine in relation to the modem health care context and make
the necessary amendments to clarify its scope, this chilling
effect will be minimized.
100. See Cal. Bd. of Optometry v. FrC, 910 F.2d 976, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating an
FrC rule to prohibit state-imposed restrictions on the practice of optometry on the grounds that
the FrC did not have the statutory authority to invalidate state law).
101. See generally Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337,338 (111. App.
Ct. 1996) (granting summary judgment to a physician in an action to have a restrictive covenant
declared unenforceable since allowing corporations to enter into employment contracts with
physicians was a violation of Illinois public policy regarding the corporate practice of medicine),
affd on appeal, No. 4-95-0569 (Il1. App. Ct. April 12, 1996); Early Detection Ctr., Inc. v.
Wilson, 811 P.2d 860, 861 (Kan. 1991) (invoking the corporate practice doctrine as a defense to a
breach of contract and breach of a covenant not to compete claim and finding that the corporation
violated the doctrine since both the physician and the professional corporation were required to be
licensed). But see St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 618 (Kan. 1994) (rejecting
physician's argument that his employment contract with the hospital was void because it
violated the corporate practice prohibition).
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IV. SAFEGUARDS
Despite the inherent concerns over corporate involvement
in medical practices vis-a-vis lay control, divided loyalties, and
commercialism, there are several legal safeguards available to
discourage abuses within corporate practices. These safeguards
include hospital licensure requirements, threat of medical mal-
practice, Medicare fraud and abuse sanctions, Stark physician
anti-referral sanctions, state disciplinary board action, and
insurance regulations. These safeguards should instill confi-
dence in state legislators who are hesitant about reexamining
the corporate practice doctrine and limiting its chilling effect
on the practice of medicine in the context of today's health
care delivery system. The quality of care rendered should not
be determined by relaxing some of the strictness of the doc-
trine given the safeguards that exist to protect against corporate
overreaching and abuse.
A. Hospitals' Independent Duty - The Corporate Negligence
Liability Theory
Hospital licensure statutes set forth the purposes for which
a hospital is organized. Many states require that hospitals are
responsible for "provid[ing] quality medical care." Having an
additional regulatory scheme via hospital licensure require-
ments as a safeguard should "eliminate[s] the concerns which
the corporate practice of medicine prohibition was devised to
quell.' ' 2 "Lay interposition in the doctor-patient relationship
would be as repugnant to hospital management as it would be
to the profession."' ' Furthermore, "[it would be incongruous
to conclude that the legislature intended a hospital to accom-
plish what it is licensed to do without utilizing physicians as
independent contractors or employees."'' Since most hospital
administrators are not medically qualified to make treating and
102. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 869 P.2d at 616.
103. Willcox, supra note 3, at 446.
104. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 869 P.2d at 618 (indicating that hospitals employed
physicians at the time the corporate practice doctrine evolved and that if the doctrine serves to
prohibit this type of relationship, it would disrupt the provision of health care).
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diagnosis decisions on their own, hospitals have to be able to
employ qualified medical practitioners to render care for their
patients.
In addition to the hospital licensure protection, hospitals
may be held liable for the negligent treatment of a patient in its
care under the corporate negligence theory of liability. Darling
v. Charleston Community Hospital 5 serves as an example of
this proposition. The Darling court held a hospital liable for
the failure of its staff to properly monitor the patient; "[t]he
[s]tandards for [h]ospital [a]ccreditation, the state licensing
regulations and .. by-laws demonstrate that the medical pro-
fession and other responsible authorities regard it as both desir-
able and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities
for the care of the patient."'" Therefore, the fear of lay hos-
pital administrative control or division of loyalty between the
physician, the hospital, and patient can be minimized by im-
posing direct corporate liability on hospitals. Unfortunately, not
all states have accepted the notion of direct corporate liability
in this context." 7 In order to protect against the abuses of the
corporate practice of medicine such as divided loyalties and lay
control of medical corporations and hospitals, more states
should embrace the Darling court's imposition of direct corpo-
rate liability."8
105. 211 N.E.2d 253,257 (I11. 965).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 475 (Conn. 1990) (holding that the
hospital did not have a duty to obtain informed consent by a patient being treated by a non-
employee physician).
108. See, e.g., Insigna v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 213 (Fla. 1989) (holding hospital liable
for failure to select and retain competent physicians regardless of their status as independent
practitioners); Oehler v. Humana Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989) (finding that a hospital
could be held liable under the corporate negligence theory for failure to monitor and supervise
treatment of a patient by physician); Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 354 S.E.2d
455, 458 (N.C. 1987) (finding hospital liable under a corporate negligence theory for failing to
monitor physicians), affd, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987); Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp.,
352 S.E.2d 902, 907 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (imposing liability under the corporate negligence
theory for failure to establish safety measures in the hospital), aftd, 362 S.E. 2d 273 (N.C.
1987); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 535 A.2d 1177, 1181-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (adopting the
corporate negligence theory and imposing liability on hospitals that fail to monitor the
competence of their physicians as well as quality of care) affd, A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 163-64 & n.14 (Wis. 1981) (adopting a
corporate negligence theory of liability); Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534,535 (NJ.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (imposing liability on a hospital for failing to investigate into potential
problems with a physician after realizing a problem existed).
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B. Physicians' Independent Duty
1. Medical Malpractice
Should a physician choose to prioritize the corporation's
interests above that of his patients, the risk is run of being held
liable on a malpractice claim. When a medical expert defines
what the standard of care would be for a given procedure, and
the physician's level of care falls below that level, the physi-
cian could be held liable for malpractice. Essentially, it is the
individual physician's balancing of interest between the patient
and employer which will determine how far she will go in
treating a particular patient. A physician must balance corpo-
rate policies regarding administration of care with the indepen-
dent responsibility to her patient. However, the fear of mal-
practice liability will probably outweigh reprisal from an em-
ployer. If a physician risks mere reprisal from an employer, she
can always find other employment. But, if a physician is found
liable under a malpractice claim, she risks losing her license to
practice and her professional record will be forever marred by
the malpractice action.
2. Utilization Review and the Wickline'" Scenario
Physicians have a duty to appeal utilization review deter-
minations which prevent a patient from receiving full and
adequate medical treatment as deemed necessary by the physi-
cian. Therefore, if a corporate entity is denying coverage for a
particular procedure or length of hospital stay, the physician
must challenge the corporation's determination if she believes
that the patient is in need of more medical care. "[T]he physi-
cian who complies without protest with the limitations imposed
by a third-party payor, when his medical judgment dictates
otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his pa-
tient's care.""'
109. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), review granted and opinion
superseded, 727 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986) and dismissed, remanded and ordered published, 741 P.2d
613 (Cal 1987). See also Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 882-83 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (limiting Wickline by imposing joint and several liability on physician and the uti-
lization review body).
110. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (emphasis added).
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The implication from Wickline is that if a physician,
against his better medical judgment, discharges a patient when
reimbursement is denied by a third-party payor, he may face
medical malpractice liability. In addition, the Wickline court
noted in dicta that third-party payors may also be held account-
able for patient injury resulting from denial of care."' Wilson
v. Blue Cross of Southern California"2 limited Wickline by
holding that physicians and utilization review bodies could be
held jointly and severally liable for patient injury. This line of
cases provides a safeguard to limit the potential abuses of di-
vided loyalties which the corporate practice doctrine set out to
protect against. Neither the physician nor the utilization review
body will be able to escape liability if the physician's medical
determination dictates that better health care should have been
administered or made available to the patient.
3. State Disciplinary Boards
State judicial bodies afford state medical boards wide
discretion to engage in disciplinary review of physician practic-
es as well as imposing sanctions. Disciplinary review arises in
cases where physicians engage in practices beyond the scope of
what the board has deemed appropriate within the practice. In
addition, state medical boards will impose sanctions on those
persons holding themselves out to practice medicine without a
license. With the threat of disciplinary sanctions, physicians
should be deterred from siding with his corporate employer
should a conflict arise where he is faced with a potential divid-
ed loyalty dilemma. Adverse actions by a state medical
board's disciplinary division may be reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank."3 This may impose adverse effects
on the physician's long-term career plans in medicine and act
to encourage physicians, whether employed by corporations or
not, to refrain from giving into divided loyalties.
111. Id. (stating that third-party payors may be held liable for defects in the design of their
cost containment schemes).
112. 271Cal.Rptr.at876.
113. The National Practitioner Data Bank was an outgrowth of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § I 1101 (West 1996).
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C. Medicare-Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Statute
The public policy concern over divided loyalties and com-
mercialization can be protected through the Medicare-Medicaid
fraud and abuse statute. Violation of this statute imposes severe
penalties.' 14 A situation involving a physician's divided loy-
alties between a hospital and patient could arise if the physi-
cian was receiving remuneration by a hospital or other health
care facility (clinic, diagnostic center) for sending his patient to
that facility. This is a valid concern embedded within the cor-
porate practice doctrine; however, the fraud and abuse statute
invalidates this activity provided that Medicare or Medicaid
funds were in any way associated.
Additionally, the concerns over commercialization, or
exploiting the growth of health care facilities for mere profit
motives, are mitigated through the statute. The fraud and abuse
statute imposes liability so long as it can be shown that a fa-
cility is remunerating cash or payments in-kind to physicians
for patient referrals. Although the fraud uid abuse statute pro-
vides a series of safe harbors for activities such as practitioner
recruitment, sale of a practice, group purchasing activities, and
certain employee-employer relations to name a few, it provides
a deterrent from divided loyalties and over-commercialization
because of the strict sanctions that may result. Therefore, the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine can be relaxed in light
of safeguards found under the Medicare-Medicaid fraud and
abuse statute.
D. Stark Physician Anti-Referral Statute (Stark Bill)
This anti-self-referral statute may reduce the fear of com-
mercialism which the corporate practice doctrine was estab-
lished to protect. Under the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act," 5
or the Stark Bill, a physician or an immediate family member
is prohibited from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients to
an entity to perform designated services in which the physician
114. Violators of the Medicare-Medicaid fraud and abuse statute may face civil monetary
penalties of up to $25,000, criminal sanctions of imprisonment up to five years and loss of
Medicare and Medicaid provider status. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-1320(7)(a-b) (West 1996).
115. 42 U.S.C.A § 1395nn(a) (West 1996).
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holds a financial interest. This prohibition has the effect of
discouraging physicians from setting up clinics or affiliating
with other medical facilities in order to exploit their patients
for self-profit. This reduces the potential risk for commercial
abuse.
Although the Stark Bill does not impose criminal sanc-
tions as does the Medicare-Medicaid fraud and abuse statute,
violating physicians risk losing their Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement eligibility and may not be able to bill any indi-
vidual for those services related to the violative self-refer-
ral." 6 Civil money penalties up to $15,000 for each violative
service billed may be imposed."7
V. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS THREATEN
THE STAYING POWER OF THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
A. Federal Legislation
There have been several federal bills introduced during the
104th Congress which threaten the staying power of the corpo-
rate practice doctrine."' Several of these bills are modeled
after President Clinton's failed Health Security Act. State laws
that discouraged the corporate practice of medicine would have
been preempted by the Health Security Act. Through a review
of recent legislation, it appears that Congress has been trying
to effectuate what was put to rest after the failure of the Health
Security Act. The common thread throughout the pending
legislation seems to reiterate Congress' stance that state laws
prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine should be pre-
empted in the wake of modem integrated delivery health care
systems.
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 nn(a)(1)(B) (West 1996).
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 nn(g)(3) (West 1996).
118. See, e.g., S. 168, 104th Cong. § 1442(6) (1995) ("Preemption of State Law Restrictions
on Certified Health Plans"); H.R. 2530, 104th Cong. § 8041(a)(6) (1995) ("Preemption of State
Laws Restrictions on Managed Care Arrangements"); H.R. 2071, 104th Cong. § 1011(E)(1)(F)
(1995) ("Preemption of State Law Restrictions on Managed Care Arrangements"); H.R. 1912,
104th Cong. § 141 (1995) ("Preemption of State Laws Prohibiting Corporate Practice of
Medicine"); H.R. 1234, 104th Cong. § 1202(a)(6) (1995) ("Preemption of State Law Restrictions
on Managed Care Arrangements").
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Although all of these bills have been sent to various com-
mittees for review, none has been passed. The effect of a fed-
eral preemption on state laws prohibiting the corporate practice
of medicine would be to completely eviscerate it from the
control of the states. Federal preemption does provide a way to
eliminate the inconsistencies and arcaneness of the corporate
practice doctrine; however, Congress should use caution when
considering a plan to completely eliminate the doctrine."9
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine would still be an
effective tool to discourage lay persons from trying to render
health treatments and diagnoses without a license. However, a
federal preemption could provide a benefit to the health care
industry by standardizing the prohibition's scope by eliminat-
ing some of the arbitrariness of states' decisions to exempt
certain practices over others.
B. State Legislation
Like Congress' attempts to soften the effects of the corpo-
rate practice doctrine, some states have recently modified exist-
ing state laws prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine.
None of the states has adopted as aggressive an approach as
Congress has with its proposals to preempt, or eliminate the
doctrine; however, it appears that several states are beginning
to chip away at the doctrine's strictness. Although many states
still interpret the doctrine narrowly and do not allow corpora-
tions the ability to employ physicians, 2 ° there appears to be a
slow-moving trend toward affording corporate health care
providers greater freedom to lawfully engage in activities with
licensed physicians and medical practitioners.
The Tennessee state legislature enacted a bill last year
which frees licensed hospitals from the dictates of the corpo-
rate practice prohibition within physician employment con-
tracts.' The legislation allowed licensed hospitals to contract
for physicians' employment so long as the hospital does not
119. See infra Part VI for a discussion as to why the corporate doctrine should not be
completely erased, but should be conditioned or modified.
120. See infra Appendix-A, "Statutory Compilation."
121. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-204, 63-6-225 & 68-11-205 (1996).
276 [Vol. 7:241
THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
interfere with the physicians' medical judgment. Although this
bill did not completely eliminate the doctrine, as the federal
preemptions propose to do, both the hospital and the employee
must meet certain conditions in order to engage in employment
arrangements."2 Furthermore, should a hospital terminate a
physician's employment because that physician failed to fol-
low orders from the employer who dictated action against the
physician's will, the amended Tennessee law creates a cause
of action for that physician."
Colorado has also been active in reanalyzing its corporate
practice of medicine prohibition. Last year, the Colorado legis-
lature expanded an already existing law which was passed in
1993 to allow licensed hospitals in counties of less than
100,000 to employ physicians. The new law allows licensed
hospitals and physicians to enter into contracts in counties
where the population exceeds 100,000.124 This law defines
parameters for the hospital to observe in order for the physi-
cian to retain autonomy in administering care to patients. Simi-
lar to the new Tennessee law, the Colorado law recognizes a
physician's cause of action against corporate employers that
control the medical judgment of its employed physicians.
The common threads that are present in both the new
Tennessee and Colorado laws illustrate an emerging trend
towards eliminating the strictness of the corporate practice
doctrine. Paramount is the idea that the physicians must retain
their autonomous medical authority. Having statutes provide a
cause of action for patients and/or physicians definitely offers a
salient safeguard against the abuses that the corporate doctrine
set forth to protect against. State legislators are finally begin-
ning to heed the calls of their constituents' complaints about
the strictness of the doctrine in the wake of integrated delivery
systems." As Tennessee and Colorado lead the way towards
122. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204(c) (1996) (describing the employment relationship
as one which does not restrict the physician from exercising independent medical judgment);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-205 (1996) (describing exception to the independent medical
judgment rule).
123. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-205(b)(8) (1996).
124. See S.B. 212,60th Gen. Assembly, Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1995).
125. In fact many physicians may even prefer the employment arrangement because of the
continuity and dependability in work hours, salary, etc.
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cutting back on the corporate practice doctrine's strictness, a
new message is being cast about the continued strictness of the
corporate prohibition.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACTION: UNIFORM PHYSICIANS EMPLOYMENT
ACT (UPEA)
In light of the changing arena within which health care
services are administered today, the validity of the corporate
practice prohibition's strictness should be challenged.'26 Al-
though one solution would be to completely erase the doctrine
through a federal preemption or repeal of state law, the doc-
trine does merit a minimal level of existence. Without a mini-
mal existence, egregious corporate abuses with respect to phy-
sician autonomy would be possible.
The fact that the doctrine should still exist minimally does
not mean that it should be kept at status quo. The doctrine, as
it exists today, has been arbitrarily applied, if at all. This un-
certainty causes a problem for those parties who desire to enter
into employment relations. If public sentiment and current
practices are moving in the direction of reanalyzing the corpo-
rate practice doctrine in light of its strictness and arbitrariness,
then state legislatures have the responsibility of embodying
these sentiments through law. 27
The strictness of the doctrine with respect to the employ-
ment context needs to be altered. The new Tennessee and
Colorado laws serve as a good model for a solution; however,
other provisions are necessary to mitigate the problems that the
corporate doctrine sets out to protect against. An ideal statute
should include a compromise position where the law would
allow for the changing health care delivery system while taking
into account the current sentiment among physicians that being
126. Hitchner et al., supra note 65, at 276.
127. See generally Mitka, supra note 11, at I (commenting on the increasing trend in the
number of employed physicians and the desire for physicians to enter into employment
arrangements). But cf. Garcia v. Tex. Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434,439 (W.D. Tex. 1974)
(raising the issue of "whether the time has come, as indicated by the movement for health
insurance and group medicine, to reverse the long settled policy against corporate medical
practice and declare it legal and proper," but determining in this case that this was not the current
social viewpoint and therefore the legislature was not compelled to act).
278 [Vol. 7:241
THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
an employee is no longer considered the great evil. These
statutes must account for innovations, while at the same time
offer physicians and patients protection against abuses of cor-
porate control.
A Uniform Physicians Employment Act (UPEA) should be
created to explicitly allow health care providers (hospitals, clin-
ics, dental corporations, etc.) to employ physicians without
insisting that the arrangement be in the form of one of the doc-
trine's traditional exceptions such as an HMO, a not-for-profit
corporation, or a professional corporation. By making this an
explicit provision of the UPEA, it would protect all parties
involved from the fear that the arrangement could be disman-
tled because of a corporate practice claim.
Like the Colorado statute, the UPEA must adopt a provi-
sion which explicitly allows physicians and patients to bring a
cause of action against the medical corporation if that corpora-
tion interferes with the physician's autonomous medical judg-
ment. Defining what corporate activity constitutes action tend-
ing to adversely influence a physician's autonomous medical
judgment is something that will be developed as claims against
corporations will be litigated. Perhaps a "corporate standard of
care" could be used during litigation to determine what level of
care a medical corporation should have demonstrated under
like circumstances. This "corporate standard of care" would be
based on what a reasonable corporation, similarly situated,
would have done under a particular set of facts. Ultimately, the
test for reasonableness will become an issue for the jury or
judge to decide.
One provision that should be included in the UPEA is not
modeled after any existing state law. This provision would
require that institutional health care providers appoint a medi-
cal director who would act as an arbiter in situations where the
corporation's breadth of power is at issue. The medical direc-
tor must be a licensed physician or similar health care practi-
tioner whose experience is consistent with what the medical
corporation and health care practitioners are offering to provide
to patients." Also, these medical directors should enter into
128. For example, the medical director of a medical corporation comprised of general
practice physicians should also be a licensed physician who practices in general medicine.
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independent contracting status with the institutional health care
provider in order to avoid the problem of being biased in favor
of the corporation. Medical directors would also be available to
testify as expert witnesses and establish for the jury what a
reasonable institutional health care corporation would do under
similar circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is still a need for the corporate practice of medicine
prohibition to protect against egregious abuses of corporate
power. However, the prohibition must be modified to adapt to
the present movement toward managed care and integrated
health care delivery systems. State legislatures can not allow
the doctrine to exist as it does today. The corporate practice of
medicine vis-A-vis modem health care practices is too strict.
Therefore, creating a Uniform Physicians Employment Act will
serve to effectuate current practitioners' sentiments as well as
provide a guide for states to eliminate some of the strictness of
the doctrine, without completely eliminating the doctrine's
protections. Since integrated health care delivery systems are
becoming the preferred method of organizing in today's health
care market, the Uniform Physician Employment Act will serve
to provide national guidance on this issue. Having uniform
laws would definitely eliminate the uncertainties many legal
practitioners grapple with when faced with an opportunity to
assist their health care clients in expanding into interstate mar-
kets.
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